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ABSTRACT 
 
This study provides a systematic comparative analysis of seven established cross-national measures 
of state capacity by focusing on three measurement issues: validity, interchangeability, and rating 
discrepancy. The author finds that the association and convergent validity of the measures is high, 
but the interchangeability of the measures is low. Through the weak external validity of three repli-
cated longitudinal studies the author demonstrates that statistical differences in measures can have 
considerable consequences for empirical results. The cause of these somewhat counterpoising find-
ings lies in strikingly high rating discrepancy within some individual countries. The author finds that 
this rating discrepancy depends systematically on the level of state capacity. No measure of state 
capacity seems to be clearly superior to others, but future studies should ensure that a given definition 
of state capacity matches with the chosen measure and should make clear whether the findings are 
generalizable or not. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Andrea Vaccaro 
Department of Social Sciences and Economics 
Sapienza University of Rome 
andrea.vaccaro@uniroma1.it 
Introduction 
The concept of state capacity has begun to play a key role in many social science subfields. Despite 
some definitional disagreements, many scholars agree that state capacity has to do at minimum with 
the ability of the state to execute policies (e.g., Skocpol 1985; Fukuyama 2004; Dinecco 2017). Ad-
ditionally, some scholars see the ability of the state to penetrate society (Mann 1984; Migdal 1988), 
to provide public goods (Norris 2012), to extract revenues (Levi 1988), to deliver well-being (Besley 
and Persson 2011), or to control economic resources (Evans 1985) as constituent characteristics of 
state capacity. Procedural definitions see impartiality (Rothstein and Teorell 2008), and efficiency 
and absence of corruption (Charron and Lapuente 2010, 2011) as fundamental features of state ca-
pacity. 
 
Cross-national empirical work has associated state capacity to various social, political, and economic 
issues. To give some examples, as to the causes of state capacity, it has been shown that state capac-
ity is affected by civil wars (Besley and Persson 2008), democracy (Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Char-
ron and Lapuente 2010; Carbone and Memoli 2015; Memoli and Grassi 2016), and constraints on 
the executive (Ricciuti, Savoia, and Sen 2019). As to the consequences of state capacity, it has been 
shown that state capacity affects positively the provision of human rights (Englehart 2009), eco-
nomic growth (Evans and Rauch 1999; Dinecco 2015), welfare state generosity (Rothstein, Sa-
manni, and Teorell 2012), public goods (Hanson 2015; D’Arcy and Nistotskaya 2017), government 
stability (Walther, Hellström, and Bergman 2019), and Millennium Development Goals (Joshi 2011; 
Cingolani, Thomsson, and De Crombrugghe 2015). Moreover, low capacity states are more likely to 
have civil wars (Fearon and Laitin 2003) and less likely to be democratic (Fortin 2012) or equal 
(Soifer 2013). 
 
Despite proliferating quantitative work on the topic, the statistical analysis of measures of state ca-
pacity remains overlooked. Hendrix (2010), Cingolani (2013), and Savoia and Sen (2015) review 
some of the measures of state capacity, but measures of other broadly related concepts such as de-
mocracy (e.g., Knutsen 2010; Teorell and Lindstedt 2010; Högström 2014), and rule of law (Skaan-
ing 2010; Møller and Skaaning 2011a, 2014) have been analysed and compared more comprehen-
sively. The study at hand fills this gap in literature and provides a systematic statistical comparison 
of state capacity measures, by focusing mainly on three specific measurement issues: validity, inter-
changeability, and rating discrepancy. 
 
A comparative statistical analysis of measures of state capacity is a valuable task per se, because our 
empirical knowledge about the similarities, divergencies, and possible shortcomings of these 
measures is limited. Anyhow, such an analysis has also major implications for the research agenda 
on the topic. For example, if measures of state capacity are equally valid and interchangeable, schol-
ars can be ensured that selecting one measure instead of another is not likely to cause major conse-
quences for their research. However, if there are large dissimilarities among measures, our alarm 
bells should start ringing. If every measure tells a different story, it becomes well-founded to ques-
tion the validity of frequently used measures as quantifications of state capacity, and even more, the 
validity of extant findings on the topic. Hence, ultimately, this study provides critical guidance for 
future quantitative work on state capacity. 
 
Last, I want to emphasize that the overall aim of this study is not to contribute to the conceptual 
literature on state capacity. Without downplaying the importance of the conceptual debate on the 
topic, I follow the advice of Adcock and Collier (2001: 533), according to whom “arguments about 
the background concept and those about validity can be addressed adequately only when each is en-
gaged on its own terms”. Since our knowledge about state capacity is affected by how it is meas-
ured, measurement issues are of primary importance.  
 
Data and Methods 
Selecting Measures of State Capacity 
A plethora of measures have been used to quantify state capacity in cross-national comparative lit-
erature. Since a comprehensive analysis of all these measures is impossible, I select some of the 
most established ones for further analysis according to four criteria. First, selected measures must 
have been frequently used to measure state capacity in recent (>= 2010) political research by many 
different scholars. This first criterion makes the original intended purpose of the measures trivial 
for aim of my study. Second, I focus on subjective measures of state capacity. All the selected 
measures are at least partially based on perception-based data from expert surveys and/or assess-
ments. Third, selected measures have been coded on a yearly basis over time and across most of the 
countries in the world. Fourth and last, selected measures are publicly available free of charge. Se-
lected measures and their main characteristics are presented in Table 1. 
 
The Quality of Government Institute of the University of Gothenburg publishes the well-known 
Quality of Government Index (Teorell et al. 2019). The index conceives state capacity as a tri-dimen-
sional concept and is based on three separate sub-indicators: bureaucracy quality, corruption, and 
law and order. QOG is computed as the average of these three sub-indicators, which are all coded 
by PRS Group’s country experts. The index provides data for almost 150 countries in the world 
since 1984. 
 
Hanson and Sigman’s (2013) State Capacity Index has gained widespread popularity among political 
researchers because it is based on strong theoretical arguments. HSI focuses on three dimensions of 
state capacity: extractive, coercive, and administrative. In turn, these three dimensions are captured 
by 24 different sub-indicators and synthesised to a single index with latent variable analysis. HSI 
provides annual data for up to 163 countries in 50 years (1960-2009). The index can be retrieved 
freely from several replication datasets. 
 
Government Effectiveness is one of the six World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators. The index 
“captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree 
of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies” (Kaufman, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi 2011: 4). WGI is a composite index based on multiple sub-indicators (48 in 2018), it co-
vers virtually all countries in the world, and it is available biannually from 1996 to 2002 and annu-
ally from 2002 onwards. 
 
The State Fragility Index is produced and published by the Center for Systemic Peace. The index cap-
tures state capacity in a broad sense and measures the “capacity to manage conflict, make and im-
plement public policy, and deliver essential services” (Marshall and Elzinga-Marshall 2017: 51). SFI 
is based on 14 sub-indicators related to political, social, economic, and security aspects of state ef-
fectiveness and legitimacy. The index provides annual scores for all countries in the world with a 
population of at least 500,000 since 1995. 
 
The Failed States Index, produced by the US-based NGO Fund for Peace, is conceived to provide an 
entry point “to understand more about a state’s capacities and pressures” (Fund for Peace 2019: 
33). FSI scores are based on expert coding, content analysis of articles and reports, and quantitative 
secondary data concerning 12 domains such as security, rule of law, and public services. More than 
100 sub-indicators are synthesised to get the final index but no precise information about these 
sub-indicators is provided. FSI has been published annually since 2005 and it ranked in its 2019 re-
port 178 countries in the world. 
 
  
TABLE 1. MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED MEASURES OF STATE CAPACITY 
Measure Producer Years  Countries Scale Underlying va-
riables 
Type of data Employed in (e.g.) 
Quality of Govern-
ment Index (QOG) 
Quality of Govern-
ment Institute 
1984-
2018  
147 0 to 1 3 Subjective Charron and Lapuente (2010, 2011); Knutsen (2013); Rothstein, 
Samanni, and Teorell (2012); Walther, Hellström, and Bergman 
(2019). 
State Capacity Index 
(HSI) 
Hanson and Sig-
man (2013) 
1960-
2009 
163 Mean 0, standard deviation 1 24 Subjective and 
objective 
Grassi and Memoli (2016); Van Ham and Seim (2018); Kim and 
Kroeger (2018); Bizzarro et al. (2018). 
Government Ef-
fectiveness (WGI) 
World Bank Insti-
tute 
1996-
2018 
 
193 Mean 0, standard deviation 1 48 Subjective Charron and Lapuente (2010, 2011); Halleröd et al. (2013); Böhmelt, 
Bove, and Gleditsch (2019).  
State Fragility Index 
(SFI) 
Center for Syste-
mic Peace 
1995-
2018 
167 
 
0 (high) to 25 (low) 14 
  
Subjective and 
objective 
Besley and Persson (2011); Cingolani, Thomsson, and De Crom-
brugghe (2015); Hiilamo and Glantz (2015). 
Failed States Index 
(FSI) 
Fund for Peace 2005-
2019 
178 0 (high) to 120 (low) 100+ Subjective and 
objective 
Møller and Skaaning (2011b); Lee and Zhang (2017); D’Arcy and 
Nistotskaya (2017). 
Impartial Public Admi-
nistration (VDEM) 
Varieties of De-
mocracy 
1789-
2019 
179 Mean 0, standard deviation 1 1 Subjective Gjerlow et al. (2018); Bizzarro et al. (2018); Grundholm and Thorsen 
(2019); Cornell, Knutsen, and Teorell (2020). 
Corruption Percept-
ions Index (CPI) 
Transparency In-
ternational 
1995-
2019 
180 0 to 10 until 2011; 0 to 100 
since 2012 
14 Subjective Joshi, Hughes, and Sisk (2015); Cingolani, Thomsson, and De 
Crombrugghe (2015); Lin (2015). 
Number of countries refers to the latest year of data. 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index aggregates existing measurements of corrup-
tion and closely related issues. Since “measures of corruption may provide another way of measur-
ing state capacity” (Englehart 2009: 46), the index has been employed as a proxy of state capacity in 
many cross-national studies. CPI has been published annually since 1995, it is based on secondary 
data from several expert surveys, and the 2018 edition covers 180 countries in the world. 
 
V-Dem Institute’s Rigorous and Impartial Public Administration provides information about “the extent 
to which public administration is characterized by arbitrariness and biases” (Coppedge et al. 2019: 
162). Even if the indicator cannot capture state capacity as a whole, it has been used in several recent 
studies as a proxy of state capacity because the functioning of a bureaucracy is arguably the most 
critical aspect of capable states (e.g., Charron, Dahlström, and Lapuente 2012; Knutsen 2013). 
VDEM is based on assessments by multiple country experts and provides annual data since 1789 for 
nearly all countries in the world. 
 
Research Strategy 
Now that we have selected some of the most relevant measures of state capacity we can proceed to 
their statistical analysis. Unless otherwise stated, FSI and SFI are reversed so that a higher score 
indicates higher state capacity. First, the main statistical properties of the measures are examined and 
compared. Then, correlations are used to analyse bivariate similarity and association among the 
measures. Correlation analysis is a conventional tool to assess the convergent validity of instruments 
measuring the same construct. All correlations are computed with both Pearson’s and Spearman’s 
methods, but only Pearson’s correlation coefficients are reported because the results are not consid-
erably affected by the selected method. With principal component analysis (PCA) I explore the di-
mensionality and multivariate association of the measures. The results of the PCA suggest that 
measures of state capacity are strongly related among each other and capture a one-dimensional con-
cept of state capacity.  
Next, measures of state capacity are examined against external predictors with regressions. The in-
terchangeability of our measures of state capacity is assessed by replicating a selection of studies on 
the effect of democracy on state capacity. The aim of these regressions is to assess whether different 
measures of state capacity lead to similar empirical findings (i.e., are interchangeable) and to answer 
the question does the choice of a measure affect the conclusions of a given study? Furthermore, as a by-product, 
we are able to assess the external validity of the replicated studies. Despite strong associations I find 
that the choice of the measurement of state capacity matters substantially for the conclusions to be 
drawn. This means that the replicated studies have weak external validity and their findings cannot 
be generalized.  
In the last part of the paper, to understand better the similarities and differences of the measures of 
state capacity, I focus on individual country ratings. First, country ratings are analysed bivariately. 
Then, by creating an indicator of multivariate country-specific rating discrepancy, I determine which 
countries have highly similar or dissimilar scores across all measures and shed light on the causes of 
rating discrepancy. Last, by shifting back the level of analysis from individual countries to global, I 
show that rating discrepancy is systematically related to the level of state capacity. 
 
Results   
Statistical Properties, Convergent Validity, and Dimensionality 
Violin plots (Figure 1) reveal the main statistical features of the selected measures in years of common 
coverage. The outlines of the “violins” show the distributional characteristics of each measure. The 
black-bordered box in the middle of each violin stretches out from the first to the third quartile of 
each variable. The whiskers stretch out to the lowest and highest observations that are not considered 
unusual in the data. Single observations that do not fall inside this range of the data are represented 
by dots above or below the whiskers. The black dot inside the box represents the median value of 
each variable. 
There are some interesting similarities and differences among our measures. Statistically, we would 
like to have more or less normally distributed variables, but the violins show that not all measures 
follow a normal distribution. CPI has particularly low modal and median values. This means that 
compared to the other measures of state capacity it compresses most observations are at the lower 
end of the scale. VDEM has a right-skewed distribution and relatively low modal and median values, 
as well. On the other side of the spectrum we have SFI, which has the highest modal and median 
values, and compresses most observations at the high capacity of the scale. FSI, QOG, and WGI 
have similar distributions with modal and median values slightly below the mid-point of the scale. 
QOG and CPI have some outliers at the high end of the scale, whereas HSI has outliers at the low 
end of the scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
FIGURE 1. VIOLIN PLOTS OF MEASURES OF STATE CAPACITY (2005-2009). 
 
Missing data handled with listwise deletion. Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
 
A compression of observations at one of the two ends of the scale is likely to be problematic, because 
intervals and distances between observations become dependent on the level of state capacity. Out 
of 170 observations in CPI (2009), there are as many as 61 observations from 2 to 3 but only 44 
observations from 5 to 10, causing unrealistic distances between observations. For example, accord-
ing to the CPI scores (2009), the difference in state capacity between Liberia (3.0) and China (3.6) is 
smaller than the difference between Norway (8.6) and Denmark (9.3), and the difference between 
Austria (7.9) and the Netherlands (8.9) is twice the size of the difference between the Dem. Rep. of 
Congo (1.9) and Belarus (2.4).  
SFI has similar limitations at the opposite end of the scale, since it rates only 8 countries from 20 to 
25 (low capacity) but 61 countries from 0 to 5 (high capacity) in 2009. Additionally, according to SFI 
almost 20 countries have the maximum possible level of state capacity. This is extremely problematic 
for two reasons: First, if some of these countries improved their level of state capacity, SFI would 
not be able to capture the improvements. Second, since other measures of state capacity are able to 
distinguish between these countries almost without exceptions, we are induced to conclude that these 
countries do have some differences in state capacity, but SFI is not able to capture them. 
Now we have some information about the main statistical properties of the measures, but we do not 
know if these measures are associated among each other. With bivariate correlations we can assess 
the strength of the relationship between two measures. Moreover, correlations against other measures 
of the same construct are conventionally used as a tool of measurement validation. Correlation coef-
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ficients (Table 2) show that the measures are highly correlated among each other. The weakest cor-
relations are between SFI and VDEM (0.70) and HSI and VDEM (0.72), while the strongest corre-
lations are between CPI and WGI (0.94) and QOG and WGI (0.93). These findings indicate a high 
convergent validity of all the measures. 
 
TABLE 2. PAIRWISE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS OF MEASURES OF STATE CAPACITY (2005-
2009). 
 FSI QOG HSI SFI WGI CPI VDEM 
FSI 1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QOG 0.87 
(671) 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HSI 0.85 
(784) 
0.86 
(665) 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SFI 0.87 
(796) 
0.76 
(675) 
0.83 
(809) 
1.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WGI 0.90 0.93 0.90 0.81 1.00   
 (820) (685) (809) (824)    
CPI 0.89 0.91 0.84 0.75 0.94 1.00  
 (794) (674) (782) (795) (824)   
VDEM 0.81 0.80 0.72 0.70 0.83 0.84 1.00 
 (820) (685) (809) (824) (864) (824)  
Note: Pearson’s correlation coefficients in common years of coverage (2005-2009). Number of observations in parentheses; all 
coefficients significant at the p < 0.001 level. 
 
So far, we have examined measures of state capacity in years of common coverage. Despite some 
differences in main statistical properties, we have found that measures of state capacity are strongly 
related to each other from 2005 to 2009. Yet, the strong correlations hold also over a longer time 
period1 (Tables A1-A9, Appendix A). Generally, correlation coefficients are high throughout the an-
alysed period and it is astonishing how consistent the bivariate relationships are over time. Only in 
one case the strength of the correlation varies more than 0.1: the correlation between QOG and CPI 
ranges from 0.81 (1995) to 0.93 (multiple years). However, if we exclude 1995, the correlation be-
tween QOG and CPI is never lower than 0.90. Moreover, also the correlations between CPI and 
HSI, and CPI and VDEM take a pronounced leap from 1995 to 1996, suggesting that there could be 
                                                     
1 1995-2017; data before 1995 is not analysed because most of the measures do not cover earlier years. 
something anomalous in the CPI scores of 1995. Certainly, the scarce amount of countries (39) rated 
by CPI in 1995 can affect its relationship with other measures. 
Bivariate correlations provide information about the relationship between two given variables. How-
ever, we can analyse the relationship among our measures of state capacity with multivariate methods 
as well. PCA is often used as a variable-reduction technique but it can also help to understand better 
the common dimensionality and the multivariate association among multiple variables. The results 
of the PCA (Table 3) show that almost 87% of the common variance can be attributed to one single 
component. The second component explains only around 5% of the common variance. Since ac-
cording to the Kaiser criterion components with eigenvalues under 1.0 should not be retained, the 
PCA indicates that the measures of state capacity are best represented by one single dimension and 
suggests that all the indicators measure the same concept. Only if we would have found the second 
component to explain a substantial amount of common variance, we could have questioned whether 
our measures capture the same concept at all. Robustness tests with extended year coverage do not 
change our conclusions and the bottom line remains the same: the instruments measure one and the 
same concept of state capacity. 
 
TABLE 3. PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS OF MEASURES OF STATE CAPACITY (2005-2009). 
Component  Eigenvalue % of explained variance Cumulative % of explained variance 
1 6.084 86.91 86.91 
2 0.332 4.74 91.66 
3 0.267 3.82 95.47 
4 0.113 1.61 97.09 
5 0.095 1.35 98.44 
6 0.066 0.95 99.39 
7 0.043 0.61 100.00 
 
Interchangeability and External Validity of Previous Studies   
So far, we have found that our cross-national measurements of state capacity have high convergent 
validity, are strongly related to each other and measure the same concept. Nevertheless, high corre-
lations do not always translate into high interchangeability, which can be assessed by analysing the 
measures against external predictors. To assess the empirical consequences of choosing one measure 
instead of another I replicate three regression models published in three studies on the effect of 
democracy on state capacity. The choice of replicating studies about this specific topic is not casual 
but determined by the fact that it constitutes one of the largest literatures where state capacity is 
examined as an outcome. Besides providing information about the interchangeability of the measures, 
we are also able to assess the external validity of the replicated studies. 
I have chosen to replicate three longitudinal models. Bäck and Hadenius’ (2008) and Carbone and 
Memoli’s (2015) studies are selected because of their influential contribution to the literature on the 
topic. Grassi and Memoli’s (2016) study is selected because it is one of the most recent contributions 
on the topic and it covers a time span that is common almost to all our measurements of state ca-
pacity. Replication data is available only for the latter two studies but Bäck and Hadenius’ (2008) 
study is replicated to the best of my ability by following scrupulously the procedure described by the 
authors. I want to stress that these replications are not intended to criticize any of the concerned 
studies. To ease the comparability of the estimations measures of state capacity are normalized to 
range from 0 to 1. 
I start with Bäck and Hadenius’ (2008) study, where the authors find evidence about a curvilinear 
effect of democracy on state capacity: at low levels of democracy the effect is negative, while at high 
levels of democracy the effect is positive. To operationalize state capacity the authors aggregate Bu-
reaucracy Efficiency and Corruption from ICRG into an additive index that covers the period of time 
from 1984 to 2002. Only three of our seven measures cover the entire period of Bäck and Hadenius’s 
study, and thus, the robustness of the original study is tested only with three “alternative” models. A 
summary of the regression results is presented in Table B1 (Appendix B). 
The original model (1) confirms that democracy has a curvilinear effect on state capacity. As claimed 
by Bäck and Hadenius (2008), at low levels of democracy the effect is negative and at high levels of 
democracy it is positive. In Model 2 state capacity is measured with QOG. Now the predicted effect 
is similar but significant only at the 90% level. The strong equivalence between the two models is not 
surprising since the original measure of state capacity is based on almost the same sub-indicators than 
QOG. The curvilinear effect does not hold even closely in Model 3, in which state capacity is meas-
ured with HSI. Model 4, in which state capacity is measured with VDEM, provides some evidence 
about a curvilinear effect of democracy on state capacity (significant only at the 90% level) but in this 
case the curvilinearity is completely opposite than in the replicated model. While only at a lower level 
of significance, Model 4 suggests that the effect of democracy on state capacity is positive at low 
levels of democracy but negative at high levels of democracy. 
Average marginal effect (AME) plots (Figure 2) show a more detailed picture of the consequences of 
choosing one measure over another. In the original model the effect of democracy is likely to be 
negative in countries with a complete absence of democracy. The effect of democracy is nonsignifi-
cant in countries with a low level of democracy but becomes significantly positive in countries with 
an intermediate or high level of democracy (>= 5). Considering the levels of democracy in 2002, this 
means that already in countries such as Russia and Nigeria the relationship between democracy and 
state capacity is significantly positive. The results are similar when state capacity is measured with 
QOG. Anyhow, when state capacity is measured with VDEM the results are the opposite: from low 
to intermediate levels of democracy (<6) the relationship between democracy and state capacity is 
positive. Considering again the levels of democracy in 2002, this means that the effect of democracy 
is positive both in completely undemocratic countries such as North Korea and Saudi Arabia and 
partially democratic countries like Russia and Nigeria. With VDEM the relationship becomes non-
significant in more democratic countries. When state capacity is measured with HSI the results pro-
vide no evidence of a curvilinear association between democracy and state capacity. 
 
FIGURE 2. AME OF DEMOCRACY ON STATE CAPACITY OF MODELS IN TABLE B1 (APPENDIX B). 
 
Second, I test whether Carbone and Memoli’s (2015) findings are sensitive to the choice of the meas-
ure of state capacity (Table B2, Appendix B). Model 1 is replicated with the original measurement 
used in Carbone and Memoli’s research, where Monopoly on the Use of Force and Basic Administration 
from Bertelsmann Stiftung are multiplicatively aggregated. The original model finds strong evidence 
about a curvilinear effect of democracy on state capacity. At extremely low levels the effect is nega-
tive, but the effect turns positive after a certain level of democracy has been reached. In models 2-8 
the original measure is replaced with our alternative measures of state capacity. Surprisingly, as before, 
choosing one measure over another can lead to completely different results and interpretations. The 
strong curvilinear association between democracy and state capacity holds only with FSI or SFI. 
When state capacity is measured with WGI, CPI, or VDEM there is no evidence of such a curvilinear 
association. With QOG or HSI the curvilinear relationship is substantially weaker compared to the 
replicated model and holds only at a lower level of statistical significance.  
A more exhaustive analysis of the results reveals even further discrepancies among the models. AME 
plots (Figure 3) show that the main finding of the original model is hold only in two of the alternative 
models.  
 
FIGURE 3. AME OF DEMOCRACY ON STATE CAPACITY OF MODELS IN TABLE B2. 
 
Using FSI or SFI leads to similar findings compared to the original model, albeit with different mag-
nitudes. Models with QOG and HSI suggest that the positive effect of democracy on state capacity 
begins only after a country has reached an intermediate level of democracy. In contrast with the 
original model neither of these two models find that democracy has a negative effect in extremely 
undemocratic countries. Models with WGI, CPI, and VDEM do not support any of these findings 
and according to these three models the effect of democracy on state capacity is not dependent on 
the level of democracy at all. Model 1 confirms that “democratic duration becomes a crucial factor 
when combined with the degree of democracy” (Carbone and Memoli 2015: 18), but this finding is 
not confirmed by any of the alternative models. 
Third, I replicate Grassi and Memoli’s (2016) study and assess the external validity of its findings 
(Table B3, Appendix B). The discrepancies between the original model (with HSI) and the alternative 
models are even more pronounced than in the other two sets of longitudinal regressions. The original 
model finds a significant non-linear effect of democracy on state capacity: this effect is negative in 
autocratic countries but fades out once a country reaches a certain level of democratization. Moreo-
ver, the original model finds that left-wing executives have fostered state capacity. The former finding 
is not supported by any of the alternative models. The latter finding is confirmed only by one of the 
alternative models. 
In the original model both the main democracy term and its quadratic term are significant at conven-
tional levels. With QOG the main term is significant at the 99.9% level and the quadratic term is very 
close to conventional significance levels (i.e., significant at the 90% level), but the point estimates 
suggest a completely opposite story compared to the original model. With QOG it seems that de-
mocracy has a positive effect on state capacity in autocracies, but this effect gradually disappears once 
a certain level of democratization has been reached. With WGI or VDEM neither of the terms are 
significant. With SFI only the squared term is significant whereas with CPI only the main term is 
significant.  
AME plots (Figure 4) show more in detail how the predicted impact of democracy is sensitive to the 
chosen measurement. In the original model the initially negative marginal effect of democracy disap-
pears when the level of democracy increases. On the contrary with QOG the initially positive mar-
ginal effect of democracy disappears when a country becomes fully democratic. With WGI, CPI, and 
VDEM the average effect of democracy on state capacity does not depend on the level of democracy. 
In the model with SFI democracy increases state capacity only once a certain level of democracy has 
been reached. 
  
FIGURE 4. AME OF DEMOCRACY ON STATE CAPACITY OF MODELS IN TABLE B3. 
 
 
As to the partisan balance of the executive, the original model and the model with SFI find a positive 
impact of left-wing executives on state capacity, but instead with CPI it turns out that right-wing 
executives have a significantly positive impact on state capacity. The model with QOG supports the 
latter finding, although only weakly (at the 90% level). With WGI or VDEM, state capacity is not 
significantly affected by the partisan balance of the executive. 
The replication of three studies with up to eight different measures of state capacity has shown that 
the choice of the measure plays a key role in the conclusions drawn from the replicated studies, 
undermining both the interchangeability of the measures and the external validity of these studies. 
Since measurements do not always cover the same sample of countries, my findings could be driven 
by different samples rather than different measures. To rule out selection bias I run all the previous 
sets of models with the same sample of observations. The results are not substantially affected by 
restricting the models within each set of replications to the same sample and the conclusions are not 
altered by using a set of common observations. Selection bias does not affect the interpretation of 
models in any of our sets of replications. 
We have found strong evidence that our seven measures of state capacity are highly correlated among 
each other and represent the same one-dimensional concept. It is commonly thought that highly 
correlated variables are nearly equivalent to each other. Anyhow, our findings have shown that highly 
correlated measures can lead to completely opposing conclusions, even if regressed on exactly the 
same set of predictors with the same estimation methods. These findings indicate that the inter-
changeability of measures of state capacity is low and the external validity of the replicated studies is 
weak. Not even one single pair of measures produces consistently similar results, but WGI and CPI 
seem to be the most interchangeable pair of measures. Overall, it is worrisome that previous findings 
on the nexus between democracy and state capacity are so sensitive to the chosen measure. 
 
Country-Specific Rating Discrepancy  
So far, we have mainly found that the interchangeability of measures of state capacity is low even if 
the measures are similar and strongly associated to each other. These contradictory findings require 
further investigation, and it is likely that we will better understand what causes our contradictory 
findings if we turn our attention to the country-level. 
With bivariate scatter plots of state capacity measures (Figures C1-C21, Appendix C) we can grasp 
how similarly individual countries are rated in the most recent year of common observations. Overall, 
many countries are rated with high consistency by each pair of measures, as suggested previously by 
the correlation analysis. Somalia has an extremely low score in all measures, whereas the Nordic 
Countries, Switzerland, and New Zealand have an extremely high score in all measures. Yet, it be-
comes evident that there are also countries that are rated in a substantially different way by our meas-
urements. Keeping in mind that the measures are normalized to range from 0 to 1, some of the rating 
divergencies are astonishing (Tables D1-D21, Appendix D). 
As we already know, SFI tends to give countries higher and CPI lower scores than the other measures. 
Thus, we suspect to find large country-level discrepancies between SFI and CPI. There are as many 
as 45 countries that SFI rates more than 0.40 units higher than CPI. In seven of these, the discrepancy 
between the two ratings is more than 0.60 units: Argentina (0.70), Belarus (0.68), Jamaica (0.65), 
Albania (0.63), Ukraine (0.63), Greece (0.63), and Italy (0.61). Likewise, differences between SFI and 
VDEM are substantial: SFI rates Belarus 0.71 units higher than VDEM, and in total there are 34 
countries that SFI rates at least 0.40 units higher than VDEM.  
SFI rates countries with considerable divergencies compared to most other measures as well. It rates 
Belarus 0.60 units higher than WGI and there are five other countries that are rated more than 0.40 
units higher by SFI than by WGI. It rates Albania 0.55 units higher than QOG and there are 16 
countries that are rated more than 0.40 units higher by SFI than by QOG. It rates Belarus 0.47 units 
higher than FSI and there are five other countries that are rated with a discrepancy of at least 0.40 
units between SFI and FSI. Instead, country-specific differences between SFI and HSI are relatively 
small. The most differently rated country is Argentina, which is rated 0.36 units higher by SFI. 
Differences in country ratings between HSI and the other measures are substantial as well. Compared 
to CPI, HSI rates 16 countries at least 0.40 units higher, and six of these are rated at least 0.50 units 
higher: Iran (0.59), Russia (0.54), Venezuela (0.53), Belarus (0.52), Armenia (0.50), and Kazakhstan 
(0.50). Compared to VDEM, HSI rates seven countries at least 0.50 units higher: Egypt (0.66), Bela-
rus (0.55), Kuwait (0.55), Malaysia (0.53), Tunisia (0.50), Azerbaijan (0.50), and Kazakhstan (0.50). 
As to HSI and FSI, Iran has the highest rating discrepancy. HSI rates Iran 0.44 units higher than FSI. 
As to HSI and QOG, Venezuela has the highest discrepancy: HSI rates it 0.50 units higher than 
QOG. As to HSI and WGI, Belarus is rated 0.44 units higher by HSI and it is the only country rated 
with a discrepancy larger than 0.40 between the two indices. 
Due to CPI’s comparatively low scores, it is not surprising to find that there are seven countries rated 
at least 0.30 units higher by FSI than CPI, but no countries rated at least 0.30 units higher by CPI 
than FSI. The country with the highest difference between the two measures is Argentina, rated 0.50 
units higher by FSI. A similar pattern can be found when comparing the country ratings of CPI and 
VDEM. Five countries are rated at least 0.30 units higher by VDEM, and only one country is rated 
at least 0.30 units higher by CPI. As to the ratings in CPI and QOG, Iran is the country with the 
highest discrepancy. QOG rates Iran 0.45 while CPI rates Iran 0.08, meaning that its score is 0.37 
units higher with QOG. WGI and CPI rate countries in a relatively similar way. Philippines is the 
country with the most diverging rating (0.33 units higher with WGI). 
The country with the largest discrepancy between WGI and FSI is Cyprus, which is rated 0.81 by 
WGI and 0.48 by FSI. WGI and QOG tend to rate countries relatively similarly: there are no country 
scores with a discrepancy of more than 0.30. Differences in country scores between WGI and VDEM 
are slightly more pronounced. There are three countries with a discrepancy of more than 0.40 units 
between the two measures: Tunisia (0.45), Malaysia (0.45), and Egypt (0.42). As to QOG and VDEM, 
only Egypt is rated with a difference of more than 0.40 units between the two measures. With VDEM 
its score is 0.01 whereas with QOG its score is 0.42. Differences in country scores between QOG 
and FSI are even less marked and only two countries are rated with a discrepancy of more than 0.30 
units. The largest rating discrepancy between FSI and VDEM is about Libya, which is rated 0.05 by 
VDEM and 0.47 by FSI. Hence, the level of state capacity in Libya is 0.42 units higher with FSI than 
VDEM. There are no other countries that FSI rates more than 0.40 units higher than VDEM, or vice 
versa. 
These results have shown that measures of state capacity do not rate countries similarly. When dif-
ferences in country scores between measures are so high, it is understandable that the interchangea-
bility of measures is low. Overall, single observations with the largest discrepancies have relatively 
high scores with SFI or HSI and relatively low scores with CPI and VDEM. We can suspect that 
countries that are repeatedly among the most divergently rated ones bivariately, such as Belarus and 
Kuwait, stand out also in multivariate discrepancy. To determine multivariate rating discrepancy, I 
compute the country-specific standard deviations of all country scores. A higher standard deviation 
indicates that the ratings of a given country are more spread out across measures, and a lower stand-
ard deviation indicates the opposite. 
As suspected, Belarus and Kuwait are among the countries with the largest multivariate rating dis-
crepancy (Figure 5). This group of countries seems to have fairly heterogeneous characteristics. There 
are both developed and developing countries, and both democratic and authoritarian countries, but 
there are no Western liberal democracies besides Italy and Greece. Interestingly, not even one of the 
countries in the chart has full civil liberties according to Freedom House’s ratings of the same year. 
Politico-geographically, most of these countries are in Eastern Europe, the Middle East/North Af-
rica, or Latin America/the Caribbean, whereas Sub-Saharan African countries are completely absent 
from the chart. Nearly half of the 20 most discrepantly rated countries have a Muslim-majority pop-
ulation. Countries with small rating discrepancy can be more straightforwardly categorized into two 
distinct groups: highly dysfunctional states (e.g., Somalia, Iraq, Liberia) and Western liberal democ-
racies. These countries have either very low or very high capacity, and their scores are more or less 
equivalent across measures. 
 
FIGURE 5. COUNTRIES WITH LARGEST/SMALLEST MULTIVARIATE RATING DISCREPANCY (2009). 
 
Countries with largest discrepancy on the left. Countries with smallest discrepancy on the right. 
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Figure 6 provides illustrative multivariate information about country scores in the most discrepantly 
rated countries and confirm a pattern that was previously suggested by bivariate comparisons: most 
of these countries have relatively high scores with SFI and HSI, but relatively low scores with CPI 
and VDEM. If the shapes of the “nets” are corresponding, different countries have multivariately 
equivalent scores. For instance, Italy, Greece, Albania, and Ukraine seem to be relatively similar: 
higher ratings with SFI, HSI, and FSI, but lower ratings with the other four measurements. Russia, 
Belarus, and Kazakhstan have some analogies as well: comparatively high ratings with SFI and HSI, 
intermediate levels of state capacity with QOG, FSI, and WGI, but relatively low scores with CPI 
and VDEM. Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Cuba rated are particularly low in VDEM. Paraguay and 
Venezuela are rated comparatively low in QOG and CPI. 
Some of these discrepancies are likely to be determined by slight differences in the defining attributes 
of the measures. VDEM and CPI focus on corruption and related issues. SFI and HSI capture a 
broader set of dimensions, but in both the coercive dimension of the state plays a more important 
role than in the other measures, and both are based on several sub-indicators related to political 
institutionalization and security. WGI and QOG focus mainly on the quality of the bureaucracy, 
although the former emphasizes also the quality of public services, whereas the latter gives im-
portance as well to corruption and rule of law. FSI takes into consideration various aspects related to 
state capacity, such as the provision of public services, the influence of external actors, the ability to 
collect taxes, rule of law, environmental pressures, structural inequality, economic development, and 
public finances. Thus, with FSI state capacity is understood more broadly than with the other 
measures. 
  
 FIGURE 6. SPIDER CHARTS OF COUNTRIES WITH LARGEST MULTIVARIATE RATING DISCREPANCY. 
 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1.
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If we examine the ratings in relation to the aspects covered by each measure in individual countries, 
we can understand better some of the causes of the rating inconsistencies. For instance, it is not a 
coincidence that Belarus has very high scores with SFI and HSI but much lower scores with the other 
measures. SFI and HSI focus on some of the areas in which Belarus performs well, but neither of 
the two measures is focused on corruption or rule of law, which instead, play a bigger role in the 
other five measures. It seems that many of the countries with high rating divergency are corrupted 
but exert a strong control on the society (e.g., Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Cuba, Venezuela, Malay-
sia, Egypt, Kuwait). All these countries tend to have comparatively high scores with SFI and HSI, 
but lower scores with the other measures. 
The comparative analysis of country ratings and the analysis of rating discrepancy have shown that 
measures disagree considerably about the level of state capacity in certain countries. Some of these 
disagreements can be attributed to the different areas of state capacity quantified by each instrument, 
which is positive news. By rigorously matching a chosen definition of state capacity with a chosen 
measure, and by making these choices clear to the reader, scholars can push forward research on state 
capacity. Anyhow, it is less promising to find that rating discrepancy depends systematically on the 
level state capacity (Figure 7).  
 
FIGURE 7. RATING DISCREPANCY AND LEVEL OF STATE CAPACITY (2009). 
 
 
Regardless of the measure there is a non-linear relationship between the level of state capacity and 
rating discrepancy. Measures tend to agree about countries with extreme levels of state capacity, but 
the largest rating divergences are systematically at intermediate levels of state capacity. This is under-
standable, because survey experts and coders are more likely to agree about clear-cut cases on the 
extreme ends of the spectrum. Less clear cases are simply harder to code, and experts can be expected 
to have diverging perceptions about state capacity in these countries. Thus, systematic discrepancy 
can be attributed to the subjective nature of our measures, but it affects our knowledge on state 
capacity even when a given working definition matches perfectly with the selected measure.  
 
Conclusions 
This study has analysed and compared comprehensively seven of the most frequently used measures 
of state capacity and evaluated the validity, interchangeability, and rating discrepancy among the 
measures. The analysis has been predominantly statistical, but the possible causes of rating discrep-
ancy have been also assessed in relation to the qualitative differences in the measured construct. The 
main findings of this paper are manifold. First and foremost, the study at hand provides one of the 
first systematic statistical comparisons of measures that have been frequently used to quantify state 
capacity in political research.  
We have found that the convergent validity of the seven analysed measures of state capacity is high. 
All measures are positively correlated among each other and the correlations are strong and consistent 
over time. The unidimensionality of the measures is confirmed by a PCA. Qualitatively each measure 
captures slightly different aspects of state capacity, but the statistical analysis has shown that quanti-
tatively they measure the same. 
Despite a strong association between measures of state capacity, the set of replicated regression mod-
els has revealed that the interchangeability among these measures is low and the chosen measure 
influences the conclusions. In the most worrisome cases, we have found that two measures can lead 
to completely opposing interpretations. Scholars working on state capacity need to be aware that 
their research is not likely to be generalizable and should make clear that the external validity of their 
research is likely to be weak. Furthermore, the results of the replications cast doubt on the extant 
knowledge about the relationship between democracy and state capacity. How solid is our knowledge 
on the topic, if all replicated studies are so sensitive to the chosen measure?  
To get a clearer view of the somewhat contradictory findings about strongly correlated but weakly 
interchangeable measures, we shifted the level of analysis to the country-level and found striking 
differences in individual country scores among measures. By creating an indicator of rating discrep-
ancy, we determined the countries that the seven measurements of state capacity most agree or disa-
gree upon. The countries with the highest rating discrepancy were further analysed against each meas-
ure. High rating discrepancy can generally be attributed at least to two factors: the different aspects 
of state capacity that each measure captures and the systematic disagreement at intermediate levels 
of state capacity.  
Despite high convergent validity, our findings have shown that the measures are not equivalent. For 
instance, SFI is not able to capture possible improvements in many high capacity countries. FSI 
covers such a broad understanding of state capacity that it undermines its analytical utility in causal 
research. SFI and HSI rate countries comparatively high, CPI and VDEM rate countries compara-
tively low, and the differences can be overwhelming. For instance, if we measure state capacity with 
HSI, Egypt ranks 57th in the world in 2009 (more or less like China and Russia), but if we measure 
state capacity with VDEM, Egypt ranks 169th in the world in 2009 and performs worse than Somalia 
and Madagascar. Scholars must be aware about these divergencies and the consequences of choosing 
one measure instead of another. The selected instrument must match the working definition of state 
capacity and make clear to the reader what the selected instrument is actually measuring. 
Last, the findings of this study provide two methods-related implications. First, strong correlations 
should not be taken as a proof of equivalency or high interchangeability between measures. Even if 
it is a common practice to assess the validity of measures with correlations, the unit-level analysis of 
individual observations has shown that highly correlated measures can be substantially different. 
Highly correlated variables do not necessarily portray the same picture. Second, the findings remind 
the importance of replication studies in our field. Replications are fundamental to evaluate the ro-
bustness of previous findings and foster our understanding on any given topic. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A: Year-by-year correlations of measures of state ca-
pacity. 
 
Table A1. Correlations between FSI and other measures of state capacity over time. 
Year QOG HSI SFI WGI CPI VDEM 
2005 0.88 (123) 0.84 (144) 0.87 (144) 0.92 (144) 0.88 (137) 0.82 (144) 
2006 0.87 (137) 0.85 (160) 0.85 (163) 0.90 (169) 0.89 (156) 0.81 (169) 
2007 0.86 (137) 0.85 (160) 0.87 (163) 0.89 (169) 0.90 (167) 0.81 (169) 
2008 0.86 (137) 0.84 (160) 0.87 (163) 0.89 (169) 0.90 (167) 0.81 (169) 
2009 0.86 (137) 0.85 (160) 0.88 (163) 0.90 (169) 0.89 (167) 0.81 (169) 
2010 0.87 (137) 
 
0.89 (163) 0.90 (169) 0.88 (166) 0.81 (169) 
2011 0.87 (137) 
 
0.89 (163) 0.90 (170) 0.87 (168) 0.81 (170) 
2012 0.88 (137) 
 
0.89 (164) 0.91 (170) 0.87 (166) 0.81 (170) 
2013 0.87 (137) 
 
0.90 (164) 0.91 (170) 0.88 (167) 0.79 (170) 
2014 0.87 (137) 
 
0.90 (164) 0.92 (170) 0.88 (166) 0.80 (170) 
2015 0.88 (137) 
 
0.90 (164) 0.92 (170) 0.89 (164) 0.80 (170) 
2016 0.89 (137) 
 
0.89 (164) 0.92 (170) 0.90 (166) 0.79 (170) 
2017 0.89 (137) 
 
0.89 (164) 0.92 (170) 0.89 (169) 0.78 (170) 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients; n in parentheses; all coefficients significant at the p < 0.001 level. 
 
 
Table A2. Correlations between QOG and other measures of state capacity over time. 
Year FSI HSI SFI WGI CPI VDEM 
1995 
 
0.84 (122) 0.83 (124) 
 
0.81 (39) 0.75 (126) 
1996 
 
0.85 (122) 0.82 (124) 0.88 (126) 0.90 (53) 0.77 (126) 
1997 
 
0.86 (122) 0.84 (124) 
 
0.93 (51) 0.80 (126) 
1998 
 
0.87 (124) 0.84 (126) 0.92 (128) 0.91 (81) 0.81 (128) 
1999 
 
0.86 (133) 0.81 (135) 
 
0.91 (93) 0.80 (137) 
2000 
 
0.84 (133) 0.82 (135) 0.92 (137) 0.91 (87) 0.79 (137) 
2001 
 
0.84 (133) 0.80 (135) 
 
0.92 (88) 0.79 (137) 
2002 
 
0.86 (133) 0.78 (135) 0.92 (137) 0.92 (98) 0.79 (137) 
2003 
 
0.84 (133) 0.77 (135) 0.92 (137) 0.91 (123) 0.80 (137) 
2004 
 
0.85 (133) 0.79 (135) 0.93 (137) 0.91 (129) 0.80 (137) 
2005 0.88 (123) 0.87 (133) 0.79 (135) 0.93 (137) 0.91 (133) 0.81 (137) 
2006 0.87 (137) 0.88 (133) 0.77 (135) 0.93 (137) 0.91 (133) 0.80 (137) 
2007 0.86 (137) 0.88 (133) 0.76 (135) 0.93 (137) 0.91 (136) 0.79 (137) 
2008 0.86 (137) 0.85 (133) 0.74 (135) 0.93 (137) 0.91 (136) 0.79 (137) 
2009 0.86 (137) 0.84 (133) 0.75 (135) 0.93 (137) 0.91 (136) 0.79 (137) 
2010 0.87 (137) 
 
0.75 (135) 0.94 (137) 0.91 (135) 0.80 (137) 
2011 0.87 (137) 
 
0.75 (135) 0.94 (137) 0.92 (137) 0.79 (137) 
2012 0.88 (137) 
 
0.75 (135) 0.94 (137) 0.92 (137) 0.80 (137) 
2013 0.87 (137) 
 
0.74 (135) 0.93 (137) 0.92 (137) 0.78 (137) 
2014 0.87 (137) 
 
0.73 (135) 0.93 (137) 0.92 (137) 0.78 (137) 
2015 0.88 (137) 
 
0.75 (135) 0.93 (137) 0.93 (137) 0.78 (137) 
2016 0.89 (137) 
 
0.75 (135) 0.93 (137) 0.93 (137) 0.78 (137) 
2017 0.89 (137) 
 
0.75 (135) 0.93 (137) 0.93 (137) 0.78 (137) 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients; N in parentheses; all coefficients significant at the p < 0.001 level. 
 
Table A3. Correlations between HSI and other measures of state capacity over time. 
Year FSI QOG SFI WGI CPI VDEM 
1995 
 
0.84 (122) 0.83 (160) 
 
0.80 (39) 0.71 (160) 
1996 
 
0.85 (122) 0.82 (160) 0.84 (159) 0.86 (53) 0.71 (160) 
1997 
 
0.86 (122) 0.82 (160) 
 
0.89 (50) 0.72 (160) 
1998 
 
0.87 (124) 0.83 (160) 0.87 (160) 0.87 (82) 0.72 (160) 
1999 
 
0.86 (133) 0.83 (160) 
 
0.88 (96) 0.73 (160) 
2000 
 
0.84 (133) 0.84 (160) 0.85 (160) 0.83 (87) 0.71 (160) 
2001 
 
0.84 (133) 0.84 (160) 
 
0.89 (88) 0.71 (160) 
2002 
 
0.86 (133) 0.83 (161) 0.87 (161) 0.88 (99) 0.68 (161) 
2003 
 
0.84 (133) 0.83 (161) 0.88 (161) 0.87 (128) 0.67 (161) 
2004 
 
0.85 (133) 0.83 (161) 0.89 (161) 0.85 (137) 0.69 (161) 
2005 0.84 (144) 0.87 (133) 0.83 (161) 0.89 (161) 0.83 (150) 0.73 (161) 
2006 0.85 (160) 0.88 (133) 0.83 (162) 0.90 (162) 0.84 (152) 0.72 (162) 
2007 0.85 (160) 0.88 (133) 0.83 (162) 0.90 (162) 0.84 (160) 0.72 (162) 
2008 0.84 (160) 0.85 (133) 0.83 (162) 0.90 (162) 0.84 (160) 0.70 (162) 
2009 0.85 (160) 0.84 (133) 0.82 (162) 0.90 (162) 0.83 (160) 0.71 (162) 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients; n in parentheses; all coefficients significant at the p < 0.001 level. 
 
Table A4. Correlations between SFI and other measures of state capacity over time. 
Year FSI QOG HSI WGI CPI VDEM 
1995 
 
0.83 (124) 0.83 (160) 
 
0.73 (39) 0.76 (163) 
1996 
 
0.82 (124) 0.82 (160) 0.82(161) 0.80 (53) 0.76 (163) 
1997 
 
0.84 (124) 0.82 (160) 
 
0.77 (51) 0.77 (163) 
1998 
 
0.84 (126) 0.83 (160) 0.82 (163) 0.73 (83) 0.77 (163) 
1999 
 
0.81 (135) 0.83 (160) 
 
0.73 (97) 0.76 (163) 
2000 
 
0.82 (135) 0.84 (160) 0.82 (163) 0.74 (88) 0.75 (163) 
2001 
 
0.80 (135) 0.84 (160) 
 
0.75 (89) 0.73 (163) 
2002 
 
0.78 (135) 0.83 (161) 0.82 (164) 0.74 (100) 0.72 (164) 
2003 
 
0.77 (135) 0.83 (161) 0.82 (164) 0.75 (129) 0.71 (164) 
2004 
 
0.79 (135) 0.83 (161) 0.83 (164) 0.75 (139) 0.71 (164) 
2005 0.87 (144) 0.79 (135) 0.83 (161) 0.83 (164) 0.73 (152) 0.71 (164) 
2006 0.85 (163) 0.77 (135) 0.83 (162) 0.82 (165) 0.73 (154) 0.70 (165) 
2007 0.87 (163) 0.76 (135) 0.83 (162) 0.80 (165) 0.76 (163) 0.70 (165) 
2008 0.87 (163) 0.74 (135) 0.83 (162) 0.80 (165) 0.76 (163) 0.69 (165) 
2009 0.88 (163) 0.75 (135) 0.82 (162) 0.81 (165) 0.76 (163) 0.70 (165) 
2010 0.89 (163) 0.75 (135) 
 
0.81 (165) 0.73 (162) 0.68 (165) 
2011 0.89 (163) 0.75 (135) 
 
0.81 (165) 0.72 (164) 0.69 (165) 
2012 0.89 (164) 0.75 (135) 
 
0.81 (166) 0.74 (163) 0.68 (166) 
2013 0.90 (164) 0.74 (135) 
 
0.81 (166) 0.74 (164) 0.69 (166) 
2014 0.90 (164) 0.73 (135) 
 
0.83 (166) 0.74 (163) 0.68 (166) 
2015 0.90 (164) 0.75 (135) 
 
0.83 (166) 0.75 (162) 0.69 (166) 
2016 0.89 (164) 0.75 (135) 
 
0.83 (166) 0.75 (163) 0.70 (166) 
2017 0.89 (164) 0.75 (135) 
 
0.81 (166) 0.75 (165) 0.69 (166) 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients; n in parentheses; all coefficients significant at the p < 0.001 level. 
 
Table A5. Correlations between WGI and other measures of state capacity over time. 
Year FSI QOG HSI SFI CPI VDEM 
1996 
 
0.88 (126) 0.84 (159) 0.82(161) 0.94 (53) 0.83 (167) 
1998 
 
0.92 (128) 0.87 (160) 0.82 (163) 0.93 (84) 0.83 (170) 
2000 
 
0.92 (137) 0.85 (160) 0.82 (163) 0.94 (89) 0.84 (170) 
2002 
 
0.92 (137) 0.87 (161) 0.82 (164) 0.92 (101) 0.83 (171) 
2003 
 
0.92 (137) 0.88 (161) 0.82 (164) 0.93 (130) 0.83 (171) 
2004 
 
0.93 (137) 0.89 (161) 0.83 (164) 0.94 (143) 0.84 (171) 
2005 0.92 (144) 0.93 (137) 0.89 (161) 0.83 (164) 0.93 (156) 0.84 (172) 
2006 0.90 (169) 0.93 (137) 0.90 (162) 0.82 (165) 0.93 (158) 0.83 (173) 
2007 0.89 (169) 0.93 (137) 0.90 (162) 0.80 (165) 0.94 (170) 0.83 (173) 
2008 0.89 (169) 0.93 (137) 0.90 (162) 0.80 (165) 0.94 (170) 0.84 (173) 
2009 0.90 (169) 0.93 (137) 0.90 (162) 0.81 (165) 0.94 (170) 0.83 (173) 
2010 0.90 (169) 0.94 (137) 
 
0.81 (165) 0.93 (170) 0.84 (173) 
2011 0.90 (170) 0.94 (137) 
 
0.81 (165) 0.93 (172) 0.83 (174) 
2012 0.91 (170) 0.94 (137) 
 
0.81 (166) 0.94 (169) 0.83 (174) 
2013 0.91 (170) 0.93 (137) 
 
0.81 (166) 0.94 (170) 0.82 (174) 
2014 0.92 (170) 0.93 (137) 
 
0.83 (166) 0.93 (169) 0.80 (174) 
2015 0.92 (170) 0.93 (137) 
 
0.83 (166) 0.93 (167) 0.80 (174) 
2016 0.92 (170) 0.93 (137) 
 
0.83 (166) 0.93 (169) 0.81 (174) 
2017 0.92 (170) 0.93 (137) 
 
0.81 (166) 0.93 (173) 0.79 (174) 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients; n in parentheses; all coefficients significant at the p < 0.001 level. 
 
Table A6. Correlations between CPI and other measures of state capacity over time. 
Year FSI QOG HSI SFI WGI VDEM 
1995 
 
0.81 (39) 0.80 (39) 0.73 (39) 
 
0.81 (39) 
1996 
 
0.90 (53) 0.86 (53) 0.80 (53) 0.94 (53) 0.87 (53) 
1997 
 
0.93 (51) 0.89 (50) 0.77 (51) 
 
0.85 (51) 
1998 
 
0.91 (81) 0.87 (82) 0.73 (83) 0.93 (84) 0.81 (84) 
1999 
 
0.91 (93) 0.88 (96) 0.73 (97) 
 
0.82 (98) 
2000 
 
0.91 (87) 0.83 (87) 0.74 (88) 0.94 (89) 0.82 (89) 
2001 
 
0.92 (88) 0.89 (88) 0.75 (89) 
 
0.82 (90) 
2002 
 
0.92 (98) 0.88 (99) 0.74 (100) 0.92 (101) 0.82 (101) 
2003 
 
0.91 (123) 0.87 (128) 0.75 (129) 0.93 (130) 0.81 (130) 
2004 
 
0.91 (129) 0.85 (137) 0.75 (139) 0.94 (143) 0.81 (143) 
2005 0.88 (137) 0.91 (133) 0.83 (150) 0.73 (152) 0.93 (156) 0.82 (156) 
2006 0.89 (156) 0.91 (133) 0.84 (152) 0.73 (154) 0.93 (158) 0.82 (158) 
2007 0.90 (167) 0.91 (136) 0.84 (160) 0.76 (163) 0.94 (170) 0.84 (170) 
2008 0.90 (167) 0.91 (136) 0.84 (160) 0.76 (163) 0.94 (170) 0.84 (170) 
2009 0.89 (167) 0.91 (136) 0.83 (160) 0.76 (163) 0.94 (170) 0.84 (170) 
2010 0.88 (166) 0.91 (135) 
 
0.73 (162) 0.93 (170) 0.84 (170) 
2011 0.87 (168) 0.92 (137) 
 
0.72 (164) 0.93 (172) 0.83 (172) 
2012 0.87 (166) 0.92 (137) 
 
0.74 (163) 0.94 (169) 0.86 (169) 
2013 0.88 (167) 0.92 (137) 
 
0.74 (164) 0.94 (170) 0.84 (170) 
2014 0.88 (166) 0.92 (137) 
 
0.74 (163) 0.93 (169) 0.85 (169) 
2015 0.89 (164) 0.93 (137) 
 
0.75 (162) 0.93 (167) 0.85 (167) 
2016 0.90 (166) 0.93 (137) 
 
0.75 (163) 0.93 (169) 0.86 (169) 
2017 0.89 (169) 0.93 (137) 
 
0.75 (165) 0.93 (173) 0.86 (173) 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients; n in parentheses; all coefficients significant at the p < 0.001 level. 
 
Table A7. Correlations between VDEM and other measures of state capacity over time. 
Year FSI QOG HSI SFI WGI CPI 
1995 
 
0.75 (126) 0.71 (160) 0.76 (163) 
 
0.81 (39) 
1996 
 
0.77 (126) 0.71 (160) 0.76 (163) 0.83 (167) 0.87 (53) 
1997 
 
0.80 (126) 0.72 (160) 0.77 (163) 
 
0.85 (51) 
1998 
 
0.81 (128) 0.72 (160) 0.77 (163) 0.83 (170) 0.81 (84) 
1999 
 
0.80 (137) 0.73 (160) 0.76 (163) 
 
0.82 (98) 
2000 
 
0.79 (137) 0.71 (160) 0.75 (163) 0.84 (170) 0.82 (89) 
2001 
 
0.79 (137) 0.71 (160) 0.73 (163) 
 
0.82 (90) 
2002 
 
0.79 (137) 0.68 (161) 0.72 (164) 0.83 (171) 0.82 (101) 
2003 
 
0.80 (137) 0.67 (161) 0.71 (164) 0.83 (171) 0.81 (130) 
2004 
 
0.80 (137) 0.69 (161) 0.71 (164) 0.84 (171) 0.81 (143) 
2005 0.82 (144) 0.81 (137) 0.73 (161) 0.71 (164) 0.84 (172) 0.82 (156) 
2006 0.81 (169) 0.80 (137) 0.72 (162) 0.70 (165) 0.83 (173) 0.82 (158) 
2007 0.81 (169) 0.79 (137) 0.72 (162) 0.70 (165) 0.83 (173) 0.84 (170) 
2008 0.81 (169) 0.79 (137) 0.70 (162) 0.69 (165) 0.84 (173) 0.84 (170) 
2009 0.81 (169) 0.79 (137) 0.71 (162) 0.70 (165) 0.83 (173) 0.84 (170) 
2010 0.81 (169) 0.80 (137) 
 
0.68 (165) 0.84 (173) 0.84 (170) 
2011 0.81 (170) 0.79 (137) 
 
0.69 (165) 0.83 (174) 0.83 (172) 
2012 0.81 (170) 0.80 (137) 
 
0.68 (166) 0.83 (174) 0.86 (169) 
2013 0.79 (170) 0.78 (137) 
 
0.69 (166) 0.82 (174) 0.84 (170) 
2014 0.80 (170) 0.78 (137) 
 
0.68 (166) 0.80 (174) 0.85 (169) 
2015 0.80 (170) 0.78 (137) 
 
0.69 (166) 0.80 (174) 0.85 (167) 
2016 0.79 (170) 0.78 (137) 
 
0.70 (166) 0.81 (174) 0.86 (169) 
2017 0.78 (170) 0.78 (137) 
 
0.69 (166) 0.79 (174) 0.86 (173) 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients; n in parentheses; all coefficients significant at the p < 0.001 level. 
 
  
APPENDIX B. Regression results summaries of replicated stud-
ies. 
Table B1. Replication estimates of Bäck and Hadenius’ (2008) study. 
 Replication QOG HSI VDEM    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Democracy -0.004* -0.004 0.00003 0.003*   
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)    
Democracy2 0.001** 0.001* 0.00005 -0.0002    
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)    
Ln(GDP/capita) 0.003 0.004 0.008*** 0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)    
Trade 0.00001 0.00003 0.00001 -0.00002*   
 (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00001) (0.00001)    
British colony 0.005 0.005 0.001 -0.002    
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002)    
Lagged dependent variable 0.936*** 0.935*** 0.918*** 0.961*** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.023) (0.011)    
Constant 0.004 0.003 -0.018* -0.013*   
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.006)    
R2 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97    
Countries 132 132 150 158 
Observations 1979 1979 2317 2443    
Pooled OLS models with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, 
***p<0.001. Model 1 is a replication of Model 3 in Table 1 in the original study; dependent variable in 
Model 1 is an additive index of two ICRG indicators (PRS Group): Corruption and Bureaucracy Quality. 
Models reproduce the specification and estimation methods of the original study. Independent variables 
are taken from the QoG Standard Dataset (Teorell et al. 2019). Democracy = fh_ipolity2. GDP/capita = 
wdi_gdpcapcon2010. Trade = wdi_trade. British colony = ht_colonial. 
 
Table B2. Replication estimates of Carbone and Memoli’s (2015) study. 
 Replication 
(1) 
FSI 
(2) 
QOG 
(3) 
HSI 
(4) 
SFI 
(5) 
WGI 
(6) 
CPI 
(7) 
VDEM 
(8)    
Democracy 0.089*** 0.086*** 0.038* 0.036** 0.087*** 0.031* 0.026 0.067**  
 (0.022) (0.014) (0.016) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.017) (0.022)    
Democracy2 0.069*** 0.056*** 0.020* 0.025* 0.052*** 0.015 0.012 0.018    
 (0.019) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)    
Duration of  -0.003 -0.001 -0.0004 -0.0001 0.001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0002    
democracy (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)    
Duration of  -0.00001 -0.00001 0.00001 0.000003 -0.00001 0.00001 -0.00001 -0.000004    
democracy2 (0.00003) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002)    
Democracy*Duration  0.003* 0.001 -0.0003 -0.001 -0.001 0.00001 0.001 0.001    
of democracy (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Ethnic fractionalization -0.093 -0.120** -0.061 -0.100** -0.172*** -0.074 0.021 0.064    
 (0.069) (0.045) (0.049) (0.036) (0.045) (0.040) (0.038) (0.040)    
Log(GDP/capita) 0.099*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.054*** 0.087*** 0.040*** 0.046*** 0.030*** 
 (0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)    
Log(Area) -0.025** -0.017* -0.007 -0.005 -0.025*** -0.017* -0.026** -0.013*   
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)    
Constant 0.063 0.356*** 0.265* 0.214** 0.278** 0.352*** 0.201* 0.247*   
 (0.152) (0.098) (0.121) (0.080) (0.097) (0.089) (0.095) (0.101)    
Sigma_u 0.15 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.11 
Sigma_e 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Rho 0.82 0.93 0.97 0.90 0.90 0.95 0.90 0.93 
Between R2 0.64 0.71 0.39 0.72 0.80 0.58 0.55 0.49 
Wald chi-square (8) 248.69 207.60 72.37 284.75 730.80 175.32 96.22 91.02 
Prob > chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Countries 122 121 99 121 121 122 122 122              
Observations 344 344 284 344 344 345 343 345    
Random effect models with robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Model 1 is a replication of Model 4 in Table 1 in the original study; 
dependent variable in Model 1 is a multiplicative index of two Bertelsmann Stiftung indicators: Monopoly on the Use of Force and Basic Administration. Models reproduce the 
specification and estimation methods of the original study. Model 1 is run with original data provided by the authors; all independent variables are taken from this original 
dataset; see information about sources in Carbone and Memoli (2015). HSI provides data only until 2009. Thus, I have coded its scores in 2010 equal to its scores in 2009. 
 
Table B3. Replication estimates of Grassi and Memoli’s (2016) study. 
 Replication 
(1) 
QOG 
(2) 
SFI 
(3) 
WGI 
(4) 
CPI 
(5) 
VDEM 
(6)    
Lagged stateness 0.169*** -0.036 -0.016 0.009 0.017 0.017    
 (0.021) (0.044) (0.035) (0.012) (0.025) (0.015)    
Democracy -0.034*** 0.042*** -0.009 -0.001 0.011* -0.005    
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.011)    
Democracy2 0.004* -0.004 0.005** 0.0003 -0.001 0.005    
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)    
Executive partisan balance 0.133** -0.063 0.116*** -0.041 -0.104* 0.066    
 (0.042) (0.035) (0.031) (0.062) (0.049) (0.072)    
Level of economic development (1994) 0.095 0.068 0.286*** 0.165*** 0.143* 0.175**  
 (0.059) (0.061) (0.048) (0.045) (0.072) (0.066)    
Land size (km2) 0.018 0.007 -0.029 -0.005 -0.002 -0.018    
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.021)    
Oil rents -0.130 -0.065 -0.142 -0.219** -0.141* -0.085    
 (0.163) (0.114) (0.146) (0.078) (0.066) (0.153)    
Log(Ethnic fractionalization) -0.068 -0.049 -0.155* -0.016 -0.100 -0.078    
 (0.128) (0.141) (0.071) (0.106) (0.150) (0.085)    
Constant -0.681 -0.241 -1.616*** -0.773* -0.840 -0.979    
 (0.467) (0.343) (0.400) (0.375) (0.604) (0.533)    
Sigma_u 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.12 0.17 0.18 
Sigma_e 0.05 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.04 
Rho 0.91 0.80 0.79 0.92 0.90 0.94 
Between R2 0.30 0.15 0.76 0.89 0.38 0.49 
Wald chi-square (8) 1393.54 228.57 170.67 52.03 78.00 25.47 
Prob > chi-square 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.001                 
Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18    
Observations 197 197 197 161 186 197    
Random effects models with robust standard error in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001. Model 1 is a replication of Model 3 in Table 1 in the original study; 
dependent variable in Model 1 is HSI. Models reproduce the specification and estimation methods of the original study. Model 1 is run with original data provided by the 
authors; all independent variables are taken from this original dataset; see information about sources in Grassi and Memoli (2016). FSI is excluded because it provides data 
only from 2005 onwards. 
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APPENDIX C. Scatter plots of measures of state capacity. 
Figure C1. Level of state capacity (2009), CPI and SFI. 
 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Figure C2. Level of state capacity (2009), VDEM and SFI. 
 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Figure C3. Level of state capacity (2009), SFI and WGI. 
 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Figure C4. Level of state capacity (2009), SFI and QOG. 
 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Figure C5. Level of state capacity (2009), SFI and FSI. 
 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Figure C6. Level of state capacity (2009), HSI and SFI. 
 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Figure C7. Level of state capacity (2009), HSI and CPI. 
 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Figure C8. Level of state capacity (2009), HSI and VDEM. 
 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Figure C9. Level of state capacity (2009), HSI and FSI. 
 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
 
  
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●●●
●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●● ●
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
● ● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Haiti
Argentina
Cyprus
Norway
Denmark
Liberia
Gabon
Congo, Rep.
Congo, Dem Rep
Kenya
Somalia
Zimbabwe
Libya
Sudan Iraq
Qatar
United Arab Emirates
Pakistan
Singapore
New Zealand
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
FSI
H
S
I
  50 
Figure C10. Level of state capacity (2009), HSI and QOG. 
 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Figure C11. Level of state capacity (2009), HSI and WGI. 
 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Figure C12. Level of state capacity (2009), CPI and FSI. 
 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Figure C13. Level of state capacity (2009), VDEM and CPI. 
 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Figure C14. Level of state capacity (2009), CPI and QOG. 
 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Figure C15. Level of state capacity (2009), CPI and WGI. 
 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Figure C16. Level of state capacity (2009), FSI and WGI. 
 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
 
 
 
  
●
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
Haiti
Argentina
Uruguay
Ireland
Switzerland
Cyprus
Finland
Sweden
Norway
Denmark
Congo, Dem Rep
Somalia Zimbabwe
Libya
Sudan
Iraq
Mongolia
Myanmar
Malaysia
Singapore
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
WGI
F
S
I
  57 
Figure C17. Level of state capacity (2009), WGI and QOG. 
 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Figure C18. Level of state capacity (2009), VDEM and WGI. 
 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Figure C19. Level of state capacity (2009), VDEM and QOG. 
 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Figure C20. Level of state capacity (2009), FSI and QOG. 
 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Figure C21. Level of state capacity (2009), VDEM and FSI. 
 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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APPENDIX D. Country-specific rating divergencies among 
measures of state capacity. 
 
Table D1. Obs. with the highest rating discrepancy between SFI and CPI in 2009. 
Observation (country) Discrepancy (in units) Higher score Lower score 
Argentina 0.70 0.92 with SFI 0.22 with CPI 
Belarus 0.68 0.84 with SFI 0.16 with CPI 
Jamaica 0.65 0.88 with SFI 0.23 with CPI 
Albania 0.63 0.88 with SFI 0.25 with CPI 
Greece 0.63 0.96 with SFI 0.33 with CPI 
Ukraine 0.63 0.76 with SFI 0.13 with CPI 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
 
Table D2. Obs. with the highest rating discrepancy between SFI and VDEM in 2009. 
Observation (country) Discrepancy (in units) Higher score Lower score 
Belarus 0.71 0.84 with SFI 0.13 with VDEM 
Libya 0.67 0.72 with SFI 0.05 with VDEM 
Cuba 0.65 0.76 with SFI 0.11 with VDEM 
Tunisia 0.63 0.76 with SFI 0.13 with VDEM 
Kuwait 0.61 0.88 with SFI 0.27 with VDEM 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Table D3. Obs. with the highest rating discrepancy between SFI and WGI in 2009. 
Observation (country) Discrepancy (in units) Higher score Lower score 
Belarus 0.60 0.84 with SFI 0.24 with WGI 
Argentina 0.50 0.92 with SFI 0.42 with WGI 
Libya 0.47 0.72 with SFI 0.25 with WGI 
Ukraine 0.45 0.76 with SFI 0.31 with WGI 
Albania 0.44 0.88 with SFI 0.44 with WGI 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
 
Table D4. Obs. with the highest rating discrepancy between SFI and QOG in 2009. 
Observation (country) Discrepancy (in units) Higher score Lower score 
Albania 0.55 0.88 with SFI 0.33 with QOG 
Costa Rica 0.54 0.96 with SFI 0.42 with QOG 
Bulgaria 0.52 0.88 with SFI 0.36 with QOG 
Dominican Rep. 0.49 0.76 with SFI 0.27 with QOG 
Jamaica 0.49 0.88 with SFI 0.39 with QOG 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
 
Table D5. Obs. with the highest rating discrepancy between SFI and FSI in 2009. 
Observation (country) Discrepancy (in units) Higher score Lower score 
Belarus 0.47 0.84 with SFI 0.37 with FSI 
Lebanon 0.44 0.68 with SFI 0.24 with FSI 
Mexico 0.44 0.84 with SFI 0.40 with FSI 
Serbia 0.42 0.80 with SFI 0.38 with FSI 
Cyprus 0.40 0.88 with SFI 0.48 with FSI 
Botswana 0.40 0.88 with SFI 0.48 with FSI 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Table D6. Obs. with the highest rating discrepancy between SFI and HSI in 2009. 
Observation (country) Discrepancy (in units) Higher score Lower score 
Argentina 0.36 0.92 with SFI 0.56 with HSI 
Libya 0.35 0.72 with SFI 0.37 with HSI 
Hungary 0.34 1.00 with SFI 0.66 with HSI 
Costa Rica 0.30 0.96 with SFI 0.66 with HSI 
Italy 0.28 1.00 with SFI 0.72 with HSI 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
 
Table D7. Obs. with the highest rating discrepancy between HSI and CPI in 2009. 
Observation (country) Discrepancy (in units) Higher score Lower score 
Iran 0.59 0.67 with HSI 0.08 with CPI 
Russia 0.54 0.67 with HSI 0.13 with CPI 
Venezuela 0.53 0.63 with HSI 0.10 with CPI 
Belarus 0.52 0.68 with HSI 0.16 with CPI 
Armenia 0.50 0.69 with HSI 0.19 with CPI 
Kazakhstan 0.50 0.69 with HSI 0.19 with CPI 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Table D8. Obs. with the highest rating discrepancy between HSI and VDEM in 2009. 
Observation (country) Discrepancy (in units) Higher score Lower score 
Egypt 0.66 0.67 with HSI 0.01 with VDEM 
Belarus 0.55 0.68 with HSI 0.13 with VDEM 
Kuwait 0.55 0.82 with HSI 0.27 with VDEM 
Malaysia 0.53 0.79 with HSI 0.26 with VDEM 
Tunisia 0.50 0.63 with HSI 0.13 with VDEM 
Azerbaijan 0.50 0.60 with HSI 0.10 with VDEM 
Kazakhstan 0.50 0.69 with HSI 0.19 with VDEM 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
 
Table D9. Obs. with the highest rating discrepancy between HSI and FSI in 2009. 
Observation (country) Discrepancy (in units) Higher score Lower score 
Iran 0.44 0.67 with HSI 0.23 with FSI 
Sri Lanka 0.43 0.61 with HSI 0.19 with FSI 
Lebanon 0.42 0.66 with HSI 0.24 with FSI 
Colombia 0.39 0.66 with HSI 0.27 with FSI 
Egypt 0.39 0.67 with HSI 0.28 with FSI 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Table D10. Obs. with the highest rating discrepancy between HSI and QOG in 2009. 
Observation (country) Discrepancy (in units) Higher score Lower score 
Venezuela 0.50 0.63 with HSI 0.13 with QOG 
Armenia 0.42 0.69 with HSI 0.27 with QOG 
Paraguay 0.39 0.57 with HSI 0.18 with QOG 
Uruguay 0.37 0.79 with HSI 0.42 with QOG 
Bulgaria 0.35 0.71 with HSI 0.36 with QOG 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
 
Table D11. Obs. with the highest rating discrepancy between HSI and WGI in 2009. 
Observation (country) Discrepancy (in units) Higher score Lower score 
Belarus 0.44 0.68 with HSI 0.24 with WGI 
Venezuela 0.36 0.63 with HSI 0.27 with WGI 
Iran 0.30 0.67 with HSI 0.37 with WGI 
Algeria 0.29 0.66 with HSI 0.37 with WGI 
Ecuador 0.29 0.61 with HSI 0.32 with WGI 
Ukraine 0.29 0.60 with HSI 0.31 with WGI 
Nicaragua 0.29 0.57 with HSI 0.38 with WGI 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Table D12. Obs. with the highest rating discrepancy between CPI and FSI in 2009. 
Observation (country) Discrepancy (in units) Higher score Lower score 
Argentina 0.50 0.72 with FSI 0.22 with CPI 
Greece 0.39 0.72 with FSI 0.33 with CPI 
Mongolia 0.38 0.57 with FSI 0.19 with CPI 
Ukraine 0.34 0.47 with FSI 0.13 with CPI 
Italy 0.33 0.72 with FSI 0.39 with CPI 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
 
Table D13. Obs. with the highest rating discrepancy between CPI and VDEM in 2009. 
Observation (country) Discrepancy (in units) Higher score Lower score 
Gabon 0.37 0.59 with VDEM 0.22 with CPI 
Mongolia 0.33 0.52 with VDEM 0.19 with CPI 
Sierra Leone 0.32 0.45 with VDEM 0.13 with CPI 
Iran 0.30 0.38 with VDEM 0.08 with CPI 
Qatar 0.30 0.71 with CPI 0.41 with VDEM 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
 
Table D14. Obs. with the highest rating discrepancy between CPI and QOG in 2009. 
Observation (country) Discrepancy (in units) Higher score Lower score 
Iran 0.37 0.45 with QOG 0.08 with CPI 
Vietnam 0.36 0.55 with QOG 0.19 with CPI 
Indonesia 0.31 0.51 with QOG 0.20 with CPI 
Morocco 0.31 0.58 with QOG 0.27 with CPI 
Tanzania 0.30 0.48 with QOG 0.18 with CPI 
India 0.30 0.58 with QOG 0.28 with CPI 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Table D15. Obs. with the highest rating discrepancy between WGI and CPI in 2009. 
Observation (country) Discrepancy (in units) Higher score Lower score 
Philippines 0.33 0.49 with WGI 0.16 with CPI 
Jamaica 0.31 0.54 with WGI 0.23 with CPI 
Greece 0.30 0.63 with WGI 0.33 with CPI 
Armenia 0.30 0.49 with WGI 0.19 with CPI 
Malaysia 0.30 0.71 with WGI 0.41 with CPI 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
 
Table D16. Obs. with the highest rating discrepancy between WGI and FSI in 2009. 
Observation (country) Discrepancy (in units) Higher score Lower score 
Cyprus 0.33 0.81 with WGI 0.48 with FSI 
Argentina 0.30 0.72 with FSI 0.42 with WGI 
Sri Lanka 0.27 0.46 with WGI 0.19 with FSI 
Malaysia 0.24 0.71 with WGI 0.47 with FSI 
Ethiopia 0.22 0.38 with WGI 0.16 with FSI 
Kenya 0.22 0.36 with WGI 0.14 with FSI 
Libya 0.22 0.47 with FSI 0.25 with WGI 
Mongolia 0.22 0.57 with FSI 0.35 with WGI 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Table D17. Obs. with the highest rating discrepancy between WGI and QOG in 2009. 
Observation (country) Discrepancy (in units) Higher score Lower score 
Armenia 0.22 0.49 with WGI 0.27 with QOG 
Uruguay 0.21 0.63 with WGI 0.42 with QOG 
South Africa 0.21 0.60 with WGI 0.39 with QOG 
Thailand 0.19 0.55 with WGI 0.36 with QOG 
Bulgaria 0.17 0.53 with WGI 0.36 with QOG 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
 
Table D18. Obs. with the highest rating discrepancy between WGI and VDEM in 2009. 
Observation (country) Discrepancy (in units) Higher score Lower score 
Tunisia 0.45 0.58 with WGI 0.13 with VDEM 
Malaysia 0.45 0.71 with WGI 0.26 with VDEM 
Egypt 0.42 0.43 with WGI 0.01 with VDEM 
Ghana 0.32 0.49 with WGI 0.17 with VDEM 
Bahrain 0.32 0.60 with WGI 0.28 with VDEM 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
 
Table D19. Obs. with the highest rating discrepancy between QOG and VDEM in 2009. 
Observation (country) Discrepancy (in units) Higher score Lower score 
Egypt 0.41 0.42 with QOG 0.01 with VDEM 
Tunisia 0.39 0.52 with QOG 0.13 with VDEM 
Costa Rica 0.35 0.77 with VDEM 0.42 with QOG 
Madagascar 0.35 0.39 with QOG 0.04 with VDEM 
Vietnam 0.34 0.55 with QOG 0.21 with VDEM 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
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Table D20. Obs. with the highest rating discrepancy between QOG and FSI in 2009. 
Observation (country) Discrepancy (in units) Higher score Lower score 
Uruguay 0.34 0.76 with FSI 0.42 with QOG 
Cyprus 0.34 0.82 with QOG 0.48 with FSI 
Ethiopia 0.28 0.44 with QOG 0.16 with FSI 
Pakistan 0.27 0.39 with QOG 0.12 with FSI 
Paraguay 0.26 0.44 with FSI 0.13 with QOG 
Guinea 0.26 0.36 with QOG 0.10 with FSI 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
 
Table D21. Obs. with the highest rating discrepancy between FSI and VDEM in 2009. 
Observation (country) Discrepancy (in units) Higher score Lower score 
Libya 0.42 0.47 with FSI 0.05 with VDEM 
Tunisia 0.36 0.49 with FSI 0.13 with VDEM 
Botswana 0.32 0.80 with VDEM 0.48 with FSI 
Ghana 0.32 0.49 with FSI 0.17 with VDEM 
Burkina Faso 0.32 0.57 with VDEM 0.25 with FSI 
Scores are normalized to range from 0 to 1. 
 
